BL O/0826/24

TRADE MARKS ACT 1994

IN THE MATTER OF TRADE MARK APPLICATION No. 3792465
BY SEARIDE INTERNATIONAL LTD
TO REGISTER THE TRADE MARK:



IN CLASSES 37 AND 42

-AND-

THE OPPOSITION THERETO UNDER No. 436290
BY ALEJANDRO VICENTE LÓPEZ

Background and pleadings

1. On 6 May 2022, Searide International Ltd (**"the Applicant"**), applied to register the trade mark shown on the cover page of this decision. The application was accepted and published for opposition purposes in the Trade Marks Journal on 17 June 2022. Registration is sought for the following services in Classes 37 and 42:

Class 37

Naval shipbuilding; Naval shipyard services; Building of naval vessels.

Class 42

Design services in the field of naval shipbuilding.

2. On 16 September 2022, Alejandro Vicente López (**"the Opponent"**) opposed the application under section 5(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (**"the Act"**). The opposition is directed at all the applied-for services.

3. The Opponent relies on its UK trade mark registration shown below, trade mark number 3817750, which was filed on 8 August 2022, claiming a priority date of 10 February 2022 from its EU Trade Mark No. 18651274. Following the filing of the opposition the Opponent's mark became registered on 28 October 2022.

4. The Opponent relies on all the goods for which his mark is registered, namely:

Class 12

Apparatus for locomotion by water; Catamarans.

5. By virtue of the priority date claimed, the trade mark upon which the Opponent relies qualifies as an earlier trade mark pursuant to section 6 of the Act.

6. The Opponent argues that the marks are similar overall, submitting that the *"applicant's mark and the Opponent's mark incorporate the identical wording SeaRide, and an identical horse head logo,"* and it argues that the respective goods and services are similar, thus giving rise to a likelihood of confusion.

7. The Applicant filed a counterstatement on 17 May 2023 denying the claims made and submitted the following: *"we dent* [sic.] *the ground set out by the other party as per the contract signed by both parties and stating that the claimed Searide brand is the property of Searide International. We seek proof of the contract that has been signed between the parties for having Searide brand as a fully recognized property of Searide International Ltd."*

8. Neither party elected to file evidence during the evidence rounds of these proceedings and neither party elected to file written submissions.

9. A hearing took place before me on 9 May 2024, at which the Applicant was represented by its general manager, Mr Fernando Ventureira, a litigant in person. The Opponent has been represented by Pure Ideas Limited throughout these proceedings, but elected not to attend the hearing, and did not file any submissions in lieu of attendance.

10. I make my decision following a careful consideration of the papers before me and the oral submissions made by the Applicant at the hearing.

Preliminary Issues

11. At the hearing Mr Ventureira sought to defend the Applicant against the opposition by claiming that he registered his company on 12 May 2020, and the Applicant should be entitled to use the company name 'Searide'; and that he has been using the brand and investing in it for at least the last four years.

12. He also submitted that there is a contract that exists between the parties, notarised by a notary in Spain, and that in accordance with the terms of that contract, he/ the Applicant is the owner of the 'Searide brand'. He submitted that he has been carrying

out his business and investing money in developing the brand, convinced that the brand belongs to him because of that contract. He submitted words to the effect that the Opponent has not exhibited *"professional behaviour"* because he is not doing anything with the brand and despite the contract between them saying *"that the brand is mine,* [the Opponent is] *requesting from me €200,000 to give me the brand that is already mine"*.

13. At the hearing I informed Mr Ventureira that whilst I appreciate he says that there's a contract that exists between the parties, I did not have a copy of that contract before me as it had not been submitted as evidence. I explained that even if I had a copy of the contract, it is not for me to decide on any potential contractual conflict between the parties and that the existence of the contract would not in any event be a sufficient reason for rejecting the opposition.

14. I explained that the reason for this was because I must proceed on the basis that the earlier mark is valid, as per section 72 of the Act, which provides that *"in all legal proceedings relating to a registered trade mark (including proceedings for rectification of the register) the registration of a person as proprietor of a trade mark shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the original registration and of any subsequent assignment or other transmission of it."* Therefore, even if the Applicant believes the 'brand' should not belong to the Opponent, such an argument cannot be raised as a counterclaim in opposition proceedings since it is challenging the validity of the trade mark registration.

15. I made reference to Trade Mark Practice Notice ('TPN') 4/2000, paragraph 21, which states:

> "It has been noted that some counterstatements seek to challenge the validity of the trade mark(s) on which the opposition/invalidity proceedings are based. Whilst such claims can be made before the Court - see Civil Procedure Rules at Part 49 - the trade mark rules do not make provision for the making of such a counterclaim in opposition or invalidity proceedings before the Registrar. Should any party wish to challenge the validity of a trade mark cited in the statement of case then it would be a matter for them to commence revocation or invalidity proceedings before the Registrar or the Court."

16. I confirmed that the Applicant had been made aware of this TPN on three separate occasions during the proceedings, in the Registry's official letters dated 8 December 2022, 7 March 2023 and 4 May 2023.

17. In light of this, I therefore confirmed that the Applicant's counterclaim is not relevant to these proceedings and that if the Applicant considers it has a counterclaim, it cannot be raised in these proceedings and it would be a matter for the Applicant to raise separate proceedings.

18. Furthermore, although not noted by me at the hearing, I note that Mr Ventureira's use of the company name/ brand 'Searide' for at least the last four years is also not a viable defence to the opposition claim. Section 4.5 of the Trade Marks Manual states that:

> "The viability of such a defence was considered by Ms Anna Carboni, sitting as the appointed person, in *Ion Associates Ltd v Philip Stainton & Anor*, BL O-211-09. Ms Carboni rejected the defence as being wrong in law. Parties are reminded that defences to section 5(1) or (2) grounds based on the applicant for registration/registered proprietor owning another mark which is earlier still compared to the attacker's mark, or having used the trade mark before the attacker used or registered its mark are wrong in law. If the owner of the mark under attack has an earlier mark or right which could be used to oppose or invalidate the trade mark relied upon by the attacker, and the applicant for registration/registered proprietor wishes to invoke that earlier mark/right, the proper course is to oppose or apply to invalidate the attacker's mark."

19. Even if it is the case that the Applicant started his business before the Opponent, or even if it is the case that the Applicant has a contractual right to be the owner of the 'Searide' brand, these are not viable defences to opposition proceedings and I must confine my attention to the trade mark issues under section 5(2)(b) of the Act.

Assimilated Law

20. The provisions of the Act relied upon in these proceedings are assimilated law, as they are derived from EU law. Although the UK has left the EU, section 6(3)(a) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (as amended by Schedule 2 of the Retained

EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023) requires tribunals applying assimilated law to follow assimilated EU case law. That is why this decision refers to decisions of the EU courts which predate the UK's withdrawal from the EU.

DECISION

Legislation and Case Law

21. Section 5(2)(b) the Act is as follows:

> "5(2) A trade mark shall not be registered if because-
>
> [...]
>
> (b) it is similar to an earlier trade mark and is to be registered for goods or services identical with or similar to those for which the earlier trade (mark is protected,
>
> there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark".

22. I am guided by the following principles which are gleaned from the decisions of the EU courts in *Sabel BV v Puma AG,* Case C-251/95, *Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc,* Case C-39/97, *Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co GmbH v Klijsen Handel B.V.* Case C-342/97, *Marca Mode CV v Adidas AG & Adidas Benelux BV,* Case C-425/98, *Matratzen Concord GmbH v OHIM*, Case C-3/03, *Medion AG v. Thomson Multimedia Sales Germany & Austria GmbH,* Case C-120/04, *Shaker di L. Laudato & C. Sas v OHIM,* Case C-334/05P and *Bimbo SA v OHIM,* Case C-591/12P:

(a) the likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking account of all relevant factors;

(b) the matter must be judged through the eyes of the average consumer of the goods or services in question, who is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect and observant, but who rarely has the chance to make direct comparisons between marks and must instead rely upon the

imperfect picture of them he has kept in his mind, and whose attention varies according to the category of goods or services in question;

(c) the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details;

(d) the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must normally be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the marks bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components, but it is only when all other components of a complex mark are negligible that it is permissible to make the comparison solely on the basis of the dominant elements;

(e) nevertheless, the overall impression conveyed to the public by a composite trade mark may be dominated by one or more of its components;

(f) however, it is also possible that in a particular case an element corresponding to an earlier trade mark may retain an independent distinctive role in a composite mark, without necessarily constituting a dominant element of that mark;

(g) a lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services may be offset by a great degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa;

(h) there is a greater likelihood of confusion where the earlier mark has a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the use that has been made of it;

(i) mere association, in the strict sense that the later mark brings the earlier mark to mind, is not sufficient;

(j) the reputation of a mark does not give grounds for presuming a likelihood of confusion simply because of a likelihood of association in the strict sense;

(k) if the association between the marks creates a risk that the public might believe that the respective goods or services come from the same or economically linked undertakings, there is a likelihood of confusion.

Comparison of good and services

23. Section 60A(1)(a) of the Act provides that for the purpose of the Act goods and services are not to be regarded as being similar to each other on the ground that they appear in the same class under the Nice Classification, nor dissimilar to each other on the ground that they appear in different classes under the Nice Classification.

24. When considering whether goods and services are similar, all the relevant factors relating to the goods and services should be taken into account. Those factors include, inter alia:[1]

(1) the physical nature of the goods or acts of service;
(2) their intended purpose;
(3) their method of use / uses;
(4) who the users of the goods and services are;
(5) the trade channels through which the goods and services reach the market;
(6) in the case of self-serve consumer items, where in practice they are found or likely to be found in shops and in particular whether they are, or are likely to be, found on the same or different shelves; and
(7) whether they are in competition with each other (taking into account how those in trade classify goods, for instance whether market research companies put them in the same or different sectors);
or
(8) whether they are complementary to each other.

25. Complementary means *"there is a close connection between them, in the sense that one is indispensable or important for the use of the other in such a way that customers may think that the responsibility for those goods lies with the same undertaking"*.[2] Complementarity is an autonomous criterion capable of being the sole basis for the existence of similarity.[3]

[1] See *Canon*, Case C-39/97, paragraph 23; and *British Sugar PLC v James Robertson & Sons Ltd.,* [1996] R.P.C. 281 – the *"Treat"* case
[2] *Boston Scientific Ltd v OHIM,* Case T-325/06, paragraph 82
[3] *Kurt Hesse v OHIM*, Case C-50/15 P

26. The goods and services to be compared are shown in the table below:

Opponent's specification	Applicant's specification
Class 12 Apparatus for locomotion by water; Catamarans.	
	Class 37 Naval shipbuilding; Naval shipyard services; Building of naval vessels.
	Class 42 Design services in the field of naval shipbuilding.

27. At the hearing Mr Ventureira submitted that his business relates to *"large, big luxury catamarans"*, whereas the Opponent's relates to *"small, very small boats"*.

28. Whilst the Applicant's specification does not include the term 'catamarans', instead, it uses the word 'naval' (which means of/or in relation to a country's naval forces), the terms nonetheless relate to shipyard services, and the building and designing of ships.

29. Although the Opponent's specification contains the term *"catamarans"*, it also contains the broad term *"apparatus for locomotion by water"*, which would include ships and naval ships.

30. In general terms, goods and services are different in their nature, purpose and method of use, neither are they typically interchangeable. I think the same can be said of the respective parties' goods and services, although I find that the goods and services may be targeted towards the same end users.

31. In its statement of grounds, the Opponent submits that:

> "The reference to complementary goods and services, relates to goods and/or services where there is a close connection, in the sense that one type of good or service is indispensable or important for the use of the other type of good or

service, with the result that consumers may think that the same undertaking is responsible for providing those goods.

As an example a consumer seeing the Opponent's mark used on a catamaran, may then think they are working with the Opponent if they opt to engage the Applicant's services, for, say the "building of a naval vessel" or the "design service of a naval vessel". The consumer will consider the businesses to be economically linked i.e. the design and manufacture of the vessels, and the vessels themselves."

32. I agree with the Opponent's reasoning, as such I find that some similarity exists between the above goods and services on the basis that they would be complementary. I also consider they would likely share the same trade channels, and as already noted, they would likely share the same user. The respective goods and services are therefore similar to a low degree.

The average consumer and the nature of the purchasing act

33. Trade mark questions, including the likelihood of confusion, must be viewed through the eyes of the average consumer of the goods and services in question. The average consumer is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. The word "average" merely denotes that the person is typical,[4] which in substance means that they are neither deficient in the requisite characteristics of being well informed, observant and circumspect, nor top performers in the demonstration of those characteristics.[5] It is therefore necessary to determine who the average consumer of the respective goods and services is, and how the consumer is likely to select those goods and services.

34. Since the Opponent's specification is very broad, it could cover small rowing boats to large naval vessels and cruise liners, and everything in-between such as yachts, catamarans, canal boats etc. As such the average consumer will vary vastly, nevertheless they will still comprise of individuals as well as professional consumers. Whilst on a small scale, boats such as rowing boats will be relatively inexpensive and

[4] *Hearst Holdings Inc, Fleischer Studios Inc v A.V.E.L.A. Inc, Poeticgem Limited, The Partnership (Trading) Limited, U Wear Limited, J Fox Limited*, [2014] EWHC 439 (Ch), paragraph 60
[5] *Schutz (UK) Ltd v Delta Containers Ltd* [2011] EWHC 1712, paragraph 98

can be purchased with relative ease, large vessels such as yachts, catamarans and naval ships would likely be commissioned and therefore the purchasing process is likely to involve a selection from catalogues, brochures and through verbal discussions with shipbuilders. The selection process of the Applicant's services is likely to involve a similar process, whereby the Applicant's services are commissioned following scrutiny of past projects which is likely to involve the consumer leafing through prospectuses, brochures and from carrying out verbal discussions with the provider of the services.

35. The selection process is therefore likely to involve both visual and oral considerations, and the average consumer is likely to pay a high degree of attention when selecting those goods and services, even where, for example, those goods are mere rowing boats, since they will want to ensure that they are fit for purpose and suit their needs.

Comparison of marks

36. I have already set out the principles gleaned from established case law with regard to comparing competing marks. I also note that the Court of Justice of the European Union stated in *Bimbo SA v OHIM*,[6] that:

> "[…] *it is necessary to ascertain, in each individual case, the overall impression made on the target public by the sign for which registration is sought, by means of, inter alia, an analysis of the components of a sign and of their relative weight in the perception of the target public, and then, in the light of that overall impression and all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, to assess the likelihood of confusion."*

37. It would be wrong, therefore, to dissect the trade marks artificially, although it is necessary to take into account the distinctive and dominant components of the marks and to give due weight to any other features which are not negligible and therefore contribute to the overall impressions created by the marks.

[6] Case C-591/12P, at paragraph 34.

38. The respective trade marks are shown below:

Opponent's mark	Applicant's mark
SeaRide CATAMARANS	

Overall impression

39. The overall impression of the Opponent's mark is dominated by the conjoined words 'SeaRide' and the horse's head logo. The word 'CATAMARANS' is subservient because of its size relative to the words 'SeaRide', and as it would be viewed by the average consumer as a description of the goods being provided under the mark, the word has limited weight in the overall impression of the mark.

40. The overall impression of the Applicant's mark lies in the conjoined words 'SeaRide' and the horse's head logo.

Visual comparison

41. Visually the marks share the identical horse's head logo, which is a stylised line drawing of a horse's head, facing left, with a sweeping, wavy mane. The marks also share the identical conjoined word 'SeaRide' which appears in both marks in the same font, both with capital letters 'S' and 'R'. Whilst the placement and comparative size of these identical elements in the marks is different, that is not enough to dispel the fact that these elements, which dominate the overall impression of both marks, are identical.

42. The difference between the marks rest in the word ‘CATAMARANS’ which is not present in the Applicant’s mark. Given my earlier comments regarding the limited relative weight of the word ‘CATAMARANS’, I assess the visual similarity as high: this is because, even if the average consumer perceives the word ‘CATAMARANS’ as descriptive, that does not in itself render it invisible.

Aural comparison

43. ‘SeaRide’ will be pronounced identically in both marks. Whilst ‘CATAMARANS’ is not present in the Applicant’s mark, given my assessment of the relative weight the word plays in the overall impression of the earlier mark, this difference is not significant. I assess the aural similarity as high.[7]

Conceptual comparison

44. With regard to conceptual comparison, I note that the marks share the same concept with regard to the conjoined words ‘SeaRide’, and the same concept with regard to the horse’s head logo, since both these elements are identical in the respective marks.

45. The word ‘CATAMARANS’ in the Opponent’s mark has a clear concept, which is not present in the Applicant’s mark, however, this word has very little relative weight in the overall impression of the earlier mark. Consequently, I find the marks to be conceptually highly similar overall.

Distinctive character of the earlier trade mark

46. The degree of distinctiveness of the earlier mark is one of the factors that must be taken into account when assessing whether there is a likelihood of confusion. This is because the more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater the likelihood of confusion may be,[8] although it is the distinctive character of a component that is similar between the marks that is particularly relevant.

[7] See the decision of the Appointed Person, in *Purity Wellness Group Ltd v Stockroom (Kent) Ltd*, Case BL O/115/22, in which it was determined that *“descriptiveness does not of itself render an element negligible or aurally invisible”*.
[8] *Sabel v Puma*.

47. In *Kurt Geiger v A-List Corporate Limited*,[9] Mr Iain Purvis Q.C. as the Appointed Person pointed out that the level of 'distinctive character' is only likely to increase the likelihood of confusion to the extent that it resides in the element(s) of the marks that are identical or similar. He said:

> "38. The Hearing Officer cited *Sabel v Puma* at paragraph 50 of her decision for the proposition that 'the more distinctive it is, either by inherent nature or by use, the greater the likelihood of confusion'. This is indeed what was said in *Sabel*. However, it is a far from complete statement which can lead to error if applied simplistically.
>
> 39. It is always important to bear in mind what it is about the earlier mark which gives it distinctive character. In particular, if distinctiveness is provided by an aspect of the mark which has no counterpart in the mark alleged to be confusingly similar, then the distinctiveness will not increase the likelihood of confusion at all. If anything it will reduce it."

48. In other words, simply considering the level of distinctive character possessed by the earlier mark is not enough. It is important to ask 'in what does the distinctive character of the earlier mark lie?' Only after that has been done can a proper assessment of the likelihood of confusion be carried out.

49. Registered trade marks possess varying degrees of inherent distinctive character, ranging from the very low, because they are suggestive or allusive of a characteristic of the goods or services, to those with high inherent distinctive character, such as invented words which have no allusive qualities.

50. The Opponent makes no claim to enhanced distinctiveness through the use made of the earlier mark, and has filed no evidence of use, therefore I only have the inherent distinctiveness of the mark to consider.

51. I have already stated that the word 'CATAMARANS' is descriptive of the Opponent's goods. The distinctive character of the mark therefore does not lie in this element.

[9] BL O-075-13

52. The distinctive character of the mark instead lies in the word 'SeaRide' and the horse's head logo and the combination of those two elements. 'SeaRide' is formed of two ordinary English words. Albeit they allude to the purpose of the goods, it is an unusual combination and not the apt term for seafaring vessels / vessels that travel by sea. As such, I consider the conjoined words to have at least a medium degree of distinctive character. With regard to the logo, I find that it is unusual and unexpected to have the image of a horse's head in relation to the Opponent's goods and as such it is distinctive to at least a medium degree. The mark is therefore distinctive overall to at least a medium degree.

Conclusions on Likelihood of Confusion

53. In assessing the likelihood of confusion, I must adopt the global approach advocated by case law and take into account who the average consumer of the goods is, the nature of the purchasing process, the distinctiveness of the earlier mark and bear in mind the interdependency principle i.e. a lesser degree of similarity between the respective trade marks may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the respective goods and vice versa.[10]

54. Making an assessment as to the likelihood of confusion is a matter of considering the relevant factors from the viewpoint of the average consumer and determining whether they are likely to be confused. This is because the global assessment is supposed to emulate what happens in the mind of the average consumer. The relative weight of the factors is not laid down by law but is a matter of judgement for the tribunal on the particular facts of each case.[11]

55. It is well established that confusion can be direct, which is a simple matter of the consumer mistaking one mark for another, or indirect. Indirect confusion is where the consumer notices that the marks are different, but the later mark and the earlier mark share common elements that lead the consumer to conclude that it is another brand of the owner of the earlier mark.[12] In *L.A. Sugar Limited v By Back Beat Inc*,[13] Mr Iain Purvis Q.C., as the Appointed Person, explained that instances where one may expect

[10] *Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc*, Case C-39/97, paragraph 17

[11] See paragraph 33 of the Appointed Person's decision in Case No. O/049/17, (*Rochester Trade Mark*).

[12] See *L.A. Sugar Limited v By Back Beat Inc*, Case BL O/375/10, paragraphs 16 to 17.

[13] Ibid.

the average consumer to reach such a conclusion tend to fall into one or more of three categories:

> "(a) where the common element is so strikingly distinctive (either inherently or through use) that the average consumer would assume that no-one else but the brand owner would be using it in a trade mark at all. This may apply even where the other elements of the later mark are quite distinctive in their own right ('26 RED TESCO' would no doubt be such a case).
>
> (b) where the later mark simply adds a non-distinctive element to the earlier mark, of the kind which one would expect to find in a sub-brand or brand extension (terms such as 'LITE', 'EXPRESS', 'WORLDWIDE', 'MINI' etc.).
>
> (c) where the earlier mark comprises a number of elements, and a change of one element appears entirely logical and consistent with a brand extension ('FAT FACE' to 'BRAT FACE' for example)."

56. I have found that the marks are visually, aurally and conceptually highly similar. I have found that the word 'CATAMARANS' in the Opponent's mark is descriptive in relation to the goods for which it is registered, and that very little weight will be attributed to that word by the average consumer, as such the overall impression of the earlier mark is dominated by the conjoined words 'SeaRide' and the horse's head logo – these elements are found identically in the Applicant's mark (the Applicant's mark being made up solely of those two elements).

57. The distinctiveness of the earlier mark lies exclusively in the conjoined words 'SeaRide' and the horse's head logo, which I have found to be distinctive overall to at least a medium degree.

58. I am conscious that I have only found a low degree of similarity between the goods and services not only on the basis of potentially shared end users and shared channels of trade but also because they are complementary. However, I note that complementarity is an autonomous criterion capable of being the sole basis for the existence of similarity. Furthermore, there is no minimum threshold level of similarity

between the goods and services that has to be shown, as it is sufficient that some similarity exists in order to consider the likelihood of confusion.[14]

59. In any event, I note that notwithstanding the relevant consumer will pay at least a high degree of attention when selecting the goods and services, this point is largely neutralised by the shared identity of the dominant components of the marks, especially when taking into account that a lesser degree of similarity between the respective goods and services would in this case be offset by the high degree of similarity between the marks; in addition to taking into account that the distinctive elements of the earlier mark are identically reproduced in the contested mark thus increasing the likelihood of confusion.

60. Having weighed up all the relevant factors, I therefore find that the average consumer or at least a significant proportion thereof, when encountering the respective marks on the goods and services at hand would either be directly confused as to the trade origin of those goods and services as they will merely mistake one mark for the other; or they will be indirectly confused as they will notice the differences between the marks (which essentially is the descriptive word 'CATAMARANS') and assume that the differences are owing to a brand extension, not that it denotes goods and services from different entities.

OUTCOME

61. The opposition under section 5(2)(b) of the Act is successful. Subject to any appeal, contested trade mark application number 3792465 shall be refused registration.

COSTS

62. The Opponent has been successful and is entitled to a contribution towards its costs based on the scale published in Tribunal Practice Notice No. 2/2016. In the circumstances, I award the Opponent the sum of £300, which has been calculated as follows:

[14] See *eSure Insurance v Direct Line Insurance*, [2008] ETMR 77 CA, paragraph 49.

Official fee for filing Form TM7	£100
Preparing the Statement of Grounds and considering the Applicant's Counterstatement	£200
TOTAL	**£300**

63. I therefore order SEARIDE INTERNATIONAL LTD to pay ALEJANDRO VICENTE LÓPEZ, the sum of **£300**. The sum should be paid within twenty-one days of the expiry of the appeal period or, if there is an appeal, within twenty-one days of the conclusion of the appeal proceedings.

Dated this 28th day of August 2024

Daniela Ferrari
For the Registrar